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Abstract 
Accommodation of differences is used by federal systems to hold their units 
together. Lack of accommodation of diversity could lead to conflicts and pose 
danger for a union, particularly, in multicultural federal systems like Ethiopia. This 
article explores the protection of diverse groups and preservation of a union in 
federal systems. It involves a comparative overview of three jurisdictions: 
Ethiopia, India and the US. Although comprehensive discussion on the relevant 
principles of federalism across these federal systems cannot be done in a single 
article, an investigation into the three jurisdictions gives insight as these 
jurisdictions demonstrate substantially different federal features while they share 
some of the hallmarks of federalism. The US represents a territorial federal 
system. Indian federation is multicultural with unique centripetal tendencies and 
this would make it a quasi-federal system. The Ethiopian federal system, on the 
other hand, appears to empower ethnic groups by making them its building blocks. 
This article examines the accommodation of diversity and protection of minorities 
in such differently designed federal systems and aims at drawing relevant lessons.      
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Introduction 
Unity, regional autonomy, protection of minorities, conflict management and 
establishment of a civilized and democratic community are among the most 
important issues in many countries. Federalism is a form of government 
structure which can address such concerns. While a unitary form of government 
may erode regional autonomy, confederations may encounter problems in 
building a lasting union. 
                                           
 Legesse Tigabu Mengie, LL. B (Haramaya University), LL.M in Comparative 
Constitutional Law (Central European University), LL.M in International and European 
Public Law (Erasmus University), Senior Lecturer in Law, College of Law and 
Governance, Jimma University; Email: <legessetigabu@yahoo.com> or  
<legeselaw@gmail.com>      
266                             MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 10, No.2                              December 2016  
 
 
Various comparative studies on different aspects of federalism have mostly 
focused on territorial federal systems. This is, partly, because most of the 
developed federal systems, which are considered as models, are territorial. 
Thomas Hueglin and Alan Fenna have, for example, contributed a comparative 
work on federalism from the perspective of democratic governance involving, 
primarily, territorial federal systems including the US, Canada, Germany, 
Australia and Switzerland.1 Michael Burgess uses such federal systems to make 
a distinction between federalism and other forms of governance.2  
In his comprehensive work on comparative federalism, ‘Comparing Federal 
Systems’, Ronald Watts compares 25 federal systems.3 His work involves 
territorial and non-territorial federal systems. However, this work gives 
emphasis to territorial federal systems, and does not provide detailed analysis on 
non-territorial federal systems like Ethiopia. We cannot expect such details as 
his work involves almost all federations.                 
Assefa Fiseha compares differently designed –territorial and non-territorial– 
federal systems from the perspective of accommodation of ‘ethno-linguistic 
groups’ and division of legislative, executive and judicial powers.4 The Forum 
of Federations, an international organization based in Canada, has also initiated 
comparative studies on federalism involving both territorial and non-territorial 
federal systems. Most of these studies emphasize on fiscal federalism, policy 
making in federations, conflict management and decentralization of power.  
This article builds on these works with a particular focus on the preservation 
of unity and the protection of minorities by comparing differently designed 
federal systems and incorporating new developments particularly in Ethiopia. 
The focus of the article is on the role of federalism in preserving unity and 
protecting the interests of minorities. These federations are designed differently 
and their federal features can be used as inputs to draw lessons for federal 
systems. The brief investigation into the ethnic based federal system in Ethiopia, 
the formally centralized quasi-federal system in India and the territorial federal 
system in the US is meant to give an overview on the role of different forms of 
federalism in preserving unity and accommodating diverse interests.              
The first two sections of the article present theoretical aspects of federalism, 
unity, diversity and the protection of minorities. The third section explores 
representativeness of shared federal institutions. The fourth section highlights 
                                           
1 Thomas Hueglin and Alan Fenna (2006), Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry, 
University of Toronto Press, p. 1.  
2 Michael Burgess (2006), Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice, Routledge, pp. 
82-99. 
3 Ronald Watts (2008), Comparing Federal Systems, Queens University Press, p. 1. 
4Assefa Fiseha (2006), Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia: A 
Comparative Study, Wolf Legal, pp. 2-14. 
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the main factors which may lead to disintegration of a federal system. Section 5 
explores constitutional adjudication and the protection of the rights of minorities 
and preservation of unity.    
1. Federalism as the Synthesis of Unity and Diversity  
1.1 Federalism 
As federalism5 is basically a political arrangement, each federal system has its 
own unique nature which is shaped by long historical, political, social and 
economic factors. Malcolm M. Feeley states that “a political entity that is 
governed by a single central government making all significant decisions cannot 
be described as federal entity without abandoning the ordinary meaning of the 
term.”6  He added that “the same is true for a group of separate political entities 
that have entered into an alliance that precludes conflict among them but leaves 
all other decisions under the control of the separate political entities.” 7 
If all basic decisions are made by the central political entity, the existence of 
constituent units does not make the system federal; rather it is simply a 
decentralized form of government. Under such settings, the units are subjects of 
the central political entity. This would mean that their power, if any, is given 
and can be taken away by the central government at any time as they are formed 
by and subjects of the central entity.8  
A federal system is also different from other forms of association like 
confederation. Such forms of arrangement give total sovereignty for the units 
and they subordinate the central political entity to the constituent units. The 
federal system is somewhere in between. Both the central and constituent units 
under a federal system have constitutionally guaranteed autonomous power and 
thus one is not the subject of the other.9 Both are established by a constitution 
which is neither under the monopoly of the central nor constituent political 
entities and both have independent legitimate power which enables them to act 
on people directly.10 
                                           
5 Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward Rubin (2008), Federalism, political identity and tragic 
compromise, the University of Michigan Press, p.7.  In this book, Malcolm M. Feeley and 
Edward Rubin have explained federalism and related concepts like political identity under 
chapter one. They have also gone through related but different concepts like decentralized 
forms of government, consociation and democracy which need to be distinguished from 
federalism.  
6 Ibid.   
7 Ibid. 
8 Ronald Watts (1999), Comparing Federal Systems, 2nd ed, Queen’s University Press, 
pp.943-945.       
9 Daniel Elazar (1987), Exploring Federalism, University of Alabama Press, 2-7.  
10 Ibid.  
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1.2 Federalism, unity and diversity 
In countries where multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic and multi-cultural societies 
have survived upon the failure of attempted assimilation processes, territorial 
federalism and individual liberalism may not function well. On the one hand, an 
attempt of high scale assimilation in the contemporary world may not be 
realized without violating fundamental rights. Instead, there may be gradual and 
voluntary assimilation through economic integration. But this cannot be attained 
easily as it is indeed a challenge to bring about substantial and inclusive 
economic changes and integration to the benefit of the general public.  
Integration usually takes a long time because individuals in pre-assimilated 
societies are shaped by their ethnic, linguistic or cultural groups and give value 
for these elements in their identity. While individual liberalism opts to leave the 
individual free to choose among values, communalism gives emphasis to 
ethnic/linguistic/cultural group identities. We can indeed recognize and promote 
all identities and at the same time respect individual rights.  
One may argue that ethnic federalism –the Ethiopian model– is not a feasible 
way to preserve unity in diversity as this would exaggerate the differences and 
lead to conflicts. Such views may give preference to other ways through which 
identity issues can be addressed as will be explained in the subsequent sections. 
Specifics in any federal system will differ based on previous political, historical, 
social and economic factors. But, the basic goal in all federal systems is to keep 
unity while addressing diverse interests.    
In the course of striking the balance between the forces of unity and 
diversity, rendering the center too strong can lead to conflict and threaten unity. 
The other extreme of unduly strong centrifugal forces may allow the regional 
sates to leave the federation easily and thus impede unity. Therefore, a wisely 
framed federation has to provide the right balance between these tensions. The 
shift from confederation to a federal form of government in the US was, for 
instance, to avoid problems associated with a weak central political entity. 
While some federal systems have constitutional mechanisms to make federal 
laws and decisions supreme over regional ones, such supremacy is reflected 
through practice in Ethiopia. If the Ethiopian regional states become strong and 
conflict arises in blurred areas of power in the future, there is no constitutional 
provision which can help us determine the decision that has to prevail. Even 
though the FDRE Constitution prevails over all federal and state laws and 
decisions (Art 9), the Constitution has not made other federal laws and decisions 
supreme over the regional ones. Considering the basic goals and principles of 
federalism, the FDRE Constitution may be interpreted as giving slight 
supremacy for the federal government. 
The Indian federation on the other hand is designed with a strong central 
government in mind and this is because of high economic and industrial 
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disparities between regions which lead to continuous conflicts threatening the 
union.11 In the US, the supremacy clause under Art VI has proclaimed the 
supremacy of the federal government if there is conflict between the federal and 
state laws.12 Conflict of laws does not refer to cases where one level of 
government encroaches into the power of the other to make a law. If this 
happens, the law is void and there is no conflict. The supremacy clause rather 
comes to play to solve conflict of laws that arise where the two levels of 
government in a federation are acting within their legitimate power.  
2. Federalism and the Protection of Minorities 
Art 27 of the ICCPR recognizes three types of minorities: ethnic, linguistic and 
religious minorities.13 A federal system is more suitable to accommodate such 
minorities and to ensure respect for identities. It should, however, be noted that 
protection of minorities is not only about equal political participation as will be 
elaborated later. It should also be noted that though we are preserving group 
identity, the rights of minorities are individual rights granted for those who 
belong to the minority group.14 Every person belonging to a minority group has, 
thus, the right, in community with others, “to enjoy culture, profess religion and 
use language.”15 Although such rights are recognized as individual rights, a 
group of individuals belonging to the minority group or the minority group as a 
whole may be affected similarly and may bring action together through a 
representative.16 Protection of minority groups cannot be realized without 
providing such groups with participatory rights. Thus accommodation of such 
minority group through participatory rights (in addition to the granting of 
minority oriented rights) is an important aspect of protection of minorities.17 
2.1 Who are minorities? 
There is no a universally accepted definition of minorities in spite of many 
attempts by scholars. Although the protection of minorities was one of the 
                                           
11 http://www.legalservicesindia.com/articles/c1onst.htm 
12 Art VI, clause 2 of US Constitution.    
13 Art 27 of the ICCPR.  This provision provides that in countries where ethnic, linguistic 
and religious minorities exist, every one belonging to such minority group should not be 
deprived of his right together with the group to manifest and use their culture, religion and 
language.  
14 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 23, Art 27, 1994, U.N. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, 
pa. 3.1 p. 1.  
15 Id. pa, 1 p. 1.   
16 Lubicon Lake Band Vs Canada, Communication No. 167/1984, (March 1990), pa.32.1 p. 
23.  
17 Robert F. Williams, Josef Marko and Allan Tarr (2004), Federalism, sub national 
constitutions, and minority rights, Westport, CT, p. 42.   
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agenda of the League of Nations,18 there was no attempt at that time to define 
the term ‘minority’. The UN Charter does not make reference to minority rights 
or minorities.19 The UDHR too emphasizes on the general non-discrimination 
principle without giving special account for the rights of minorities.  
The General Assembly took the view that it was “difficult to adopt a uniform 
solution” to this intricate problem as the question regarding minorities is 
different across countries.20 The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) provides protection for minorities without defining who 
minorities are. It states that “in those states in which ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be 
denied the right, in community with the other members of the group, to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion or to use their own 
language.”21 This is the only provision about minority rights protection under 
the ICCPR which provides some factors that are helpful in determining 
minorities i.e. ethnicity, language, and religion. However, it fails to provide a 
definition and does not therefore, answer the question: which ethnic, linguistic, 
and religious groups within the states are minorities? 
Even though the Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment 23 on 
Article 27 of the ICCPR, tried to make clarification on the rights of minorities, it 
does not attempt to approach the question directly. Its clarification was, 
however, helpful to understand the scope of the notion of minority.22 The 
General Comment makes it clear that the ICCPR does not only apply to national 
minorities but also covers migrant minorities as it does not make distinction 
between nationals and foreigners.23 However, the General Comment of the 
Human Rights Committee is not binding on the international community, and 
the Framework Convention of Europe employs the term “national minorities”.24 
This Framework Convention does not provide any definition regarding 
minorities.25  
The definition given by Francesco Capotorti is widely used. This definition 
does not, however, answer all questions about minorities. His definition reads: 
                                           
18 Steven Wheatley (2005), Democracy, minorities and international law, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 10.    
19 Ibid.  
20 Supra note 17.  
21 Art 27 of ICCPR.  
22 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 23, Art 27, 1994, U.N. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, 
pa 5.2 p 2.  
23 Ibid.  
24 The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 
1.II.1995.   
25 Ibid.   
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A group numerically smaller to the rest of the population of the state, in a 
non-dominant position, whose members –being nationals of the state– 
possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of 
the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, 
directed towards preserving their culture, tradition, religion or language.26 
If there is one majority group over the rest of the population (50%+1 of the 
whole), then that group cannot be a minority.27 However, there may be a 
situation where there is no any ethnic, linguistic or religious group which is a 
majority out of the whole population.28 Even though the above definition is very 
important in determining minorities, it cannot be free from criticism. The 
definition is narrow in scope as it employs the phrase ‘nationals of state’.29 
International law has extended its scope to protect the rights of individuals 
irrespective of nationality. According to the above definition, it is difficult for 
migrants to claim linguistic, cultural and religious rights unless they get 
nationality. It is up to the states to grant nationality and thus migrants will be 
systematically left behind if we follow the above definition.30 
Most federal systems have no clear rights of minorities regime under their 
constitutions. Under the US Constitution, there is no reference to minorities. 
There is a modicum of affirmative action (promoting disadvantaged groups) to 
bring real equality but not to preserve diverse identity. In India some religious 
groups are recognized as minorities.31 The case in Ethiopia is relatively 
complex. Even though Ethiopia has more than 80 ethnic groups, most of which 
are minorities, the Constitution does not directly address the issue of protection 
of minorities. It has also used the terminology ‘minority nationalities and 
peoples’ instead of ‘minorities’.  
According to the FDRE Constitution, only the “nations, nationalities and 
peoples”32 of Ethiopia may be determined as minorities. Such nations, 
nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia are those groups of people who satisfy two 
requirements under the Constitution; those having common culture, language or 
religion and constituting identifiable territory under Art. 39 of the FDRE 
                                           
26 Francesco Capotorti (1977), Study on the rights of persons belonging to the ethnic, 
linguistic and religious minorities, United Nations, para. 568. 
27 Steven Wheatley (2005), Democracy, minorities and international law, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 19.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Supra note 26.  
30 Perry Keller (1998), “Re-thinking Ethnic and Cultural rights in Europe”, Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies, Vol. 18, 31-33. 
31 http://www.countercurrents.org/commpuniyani101005.htm 
32 Art 39 (5) of the FDRE Constitution.    
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Constitution.33 It means that those minorities who have no identifiable territory 
because they are dispersed over the country have not been envisaged as 
minorities under the Constitution. 
Thus, there is the need for a legally binding definition to the term minority at 
domestic and international levels in order to prevent abuse from states against 
minorities. The difficulty then is the issue of diversity because it has distinct 
features in different countries. It was because of this problem that the ICCPR, 
while recognizing rights of minorities, failed to define who minorities are. 
Giving recognition for the rights of minorities under international human rights 
conventions or within federal constitutions without defining the term would 
undermine the rights of minorities as it would give states discretionary power in 
determining minorities and that may lead to systematic exclusion of minorities. 
Some modification on the definition given by Francesco Capotorti34 could 
avoid the confusion over the subject. The basic problem with Francesco 
Capotorti’s definition is that it fails to protect non- nationals as it employs the 
term ‘nationals’. It means that by using the term ‘persons’ (like Art 27 of the 
ICCPR) instead of ‘nationals’, we can protect all individuals who belong to a 
minority group. Such modification is crucial, particularly, for migrant workers 
who could be denied citizenship systematically. Once we determine minority 
groups, then we can provide them with defined rights.   
2.2 Recognition of rights of minorities and participatory rights 
The general non-discrimination principle is a human rights notion which is 
applicable for all human beings irrespective of the fact that an individual 
belongs to a minority or majority group.35 Human rights are implemented based 
on the principle of equality and they uniformly apply to everyone. The 
protection of minorities is an additional mechanism for specific group of 
persons who are determined as ethnic, linguistic or religious minority.36 While 
non-discrimination principles in international and national legal documents are 
there to avoid discrimination, i.e. different treatment which is committed most 
of the time against minorities, the rights of minorities are introduced to preserve 
differences (identities) by providing special rights.37 
Such treatment of the minorities should not be confused with positive 
discrimination/affirmative action which has the aim of achieving equality. 
Affirmative action is temporary, while the rights of minorities are permanent. 
                                           
33 Ibid.    
34 Supra note 26, para. 568.    
35 Supra note 22, para 1, p.1.  
36 Ibid.  
37 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet18rev.1en.pdf    
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Such rights should not also be taken as special benefits for a minority group.38 
They are rather inherent in a minority group and are recognized to allow 
members of such group enjoy what their language, culture and religion offers.39 
There is the need for such rights as long as we have ethnic, linguistic or 
religious minority even in settings where affirmative action is not necessary. 
Recognition of the rights of minorities would also mean increasing the scope 
of social values. Such rights preserve ways of life including cultural, religious 
and linguistic values thereby increasing the opportunity to choose among the 
ways of life40 on our planet. Any one from the majority or minority group 
should have the freedom to choose the way of life which is most important to 
him/her. Indeed, recognition of and respect for the rights of minorities would 
advance equality although the basic rationale behind such rights is preservation 
of identity.41 Full realization of these rights is possible only through the 
accommodation of minority groups in a political process. The question of who 
shall be granted participatory rights in this regard is directly related to another 
important question as to why we need to grant such participatory rights for a 
group.42 
2.3    Participatory rights that should be claimed by minorities 
As Williams and Marko noted, “participation rights should promote integration 
without ethnification of politics”.43 The Ethiopian ethnic federal system does not 
seem be in conformity with this view. The organization of regional political 
entities in Ethiopia is based on ethnicity. Thus, mere citizenship does not enable 
citizens to actively participate in politics if they are not members of the ethnic 
group of a region even if they are living there for life. The secession clause in 
the Constitution adds fuel to the ethnically organized society.  On the contrary, 
modern societies need integration and harmony in various pursuits.  
In India, although there are some regions which are organized based on 
religion or ethnicity, the central government has strong constitutional powers to 
hold the units together. In the US too, the constitutionally proclaimed 
supremacy of federal laws and decisions over the laws of states is a reflection of 
supremacy of the federal government to the required degree. In Ethiopia, the 
federal government is influential because of the party system. If the dominant 
party system fails in the future, there is no guarantee to ensure unity unless some 
constitutional amendments are made.   
                                           
38 Supra note 22.  
39 Ibid.    
40 Supra note 30.  
41 Supra note 22.  
42 Supra note 17.   
43 Supra note 17, p. 45.  
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In any federal system where diversity exists, two basic interests must be 
balanced regarding participation rights, because neglecting these interests can 
lead to conflict and disintegration. On the one hand, the groups must “have an 
effective say” in the political process.44 On the other hand, the “influence given 
to the groups must not be so strong that they can completely paralyze the 
system”.45 Williams and Marko made it clear that “participation rights ought not 
to lead to a situation in which political mobilization is based exclusively or 
primarily on ethnic arguments”.46 
3. Representativeness of Shared Federal Institutions 
3.1 The need for and representativeness of shared federal institutions 
Mere existence of principles of federalism on paper does not solve problems of 
plural societies. The practical accommodation of diversity is necessary to build 
lasting unity. Federalism is a means to reconcile clashing groups and thus 
political accommodation and mutual understanding among the diverse society is 
an essential element in every federation.47 As Watts clearly explains, every 
federal system has two basic purposes: namely ensuring self-rule through 
constitutional division of political power and (at the same time) achieving unity 
through shared federal institutions by working together on areas of conjoint 
interest.48 Here, legitimacy and efficiency of shared federal institutions are 
essential. Watts has made it clear that “representativeness within the institutions 
of the federal government of the internal diversity within the federation and 
effectiveness in the federal government decision making” are necessary if 
shared federal institutions are to be acceptable by citizens of constituent units.49 
Representativeness of the federal legislature, executive and other federal 
institutions needs special consideration in this regard. While India and the US 
have bicameral federal legislatures, Ethiopia has a two-house parliament but a 
one-house (unicameral) legislature and this raises questions as to the legitimacy 
and representativeness of the federal legislature of Ethiopia. The head of 
government in the US is the president who is directly elected by the people. 
Ethiopia and India, on the other hand, have the prime minister as the head of 
government. Such differences in the arrangement of federal institutions have 
practical implications in the functioning of federations. For example, though the 
Ethiopian and Indian parliamentary form of government, with the prime 
                                           
44 Supra note 17, p. 46.  
45 Ibid.   
46 Ibid.   
47 http://www.queensu.ca/iigr/conf/Watts/papers/majeed.pdf 
48 Supra note 8, p.83.  
49 Ibid.  
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minister being the head of government, may be helpful to establish effective 
executive decision making, there is a problem of executive dominance through 
party discipline. In this case, the representativeness of the federal government 
will be questionable. On the other hand, even though there are good checks and 
balances in the US presidential form of government, there is a risk of standoff 
while making decisions especially when the president and the Congress are from 
different parties. 
Whatever form of government a federation may have, there are shared 
federal institutions to hold the units together. Such institutions exercise power 
on areas of common interest like foreign affairs, defense and commerce. The 
role of shared federal institutions especially in India and Ethiopia where 
diversity is so enormous is very important to hold the units together as there is 
high potential for conflicts and disintegration. One way of accommodating 
regional interests in the federal shared institutions is through the upper house. 
While the US federal system provides two seats uniformly for each state, 
whether it is large or small, in the Senate,50 the House of Federation51 in 
Ethiopia and the Indian Rajya Sabha52 do not follow such uniform seat 
allocation. Indeed, such uniform allocation does not work for the two 
federations as they are composed of societies with high diversity. An inequitable 
distribution of power among the ethnic and linguistic groups at the federal level 
is a prominent problem and source of conflicts in Ethiopia and India.  
In Ethiopia, the question raised by nationalities to get an equitable share of 
power at the center is still left unsettled. Diverse groups strive to control power 
at the center which leads to continuous conflicts and instability. Thus, it is 
obvious that fairly distributed power among the nationalities is necessary if the 
tension among plural societies is to be addressed. Government systems in 
Ethiopia, including the present one, have failed to address the questions raised 
by nationalities and this is the reason for successive conflicts and removal of 
government systems by war.53  
                                           
50 Art I section 3 of US Constitution.  
51 Art 61 of the FDRE Constitution. The House of Federation in Ethiopia is the second 
chamber or the upper house, a federal shared institution, which is established to represent 
the interest of nations, nationalities and people as defined under Art 39 of the constitution.   
52 Art 80 of the Constitution of India. Rajya Sabha is the upper house in India. It is 
composed of 250 members. Twelve of them are appointed by the president and they are 
experts in specific fields.    
53 http://www.google.hu/search?q=www.oromopeoplescongress.org%2Fdocs%2FMerera-
OSA-paper. Merera Gudina, “The Ethiopian State and the Future of the Oromos: The 
Struggle for ‘Self-Rule and Shared-Rule”, paper presented in OSA Annual Conference, 
Minneapolis, USA, 2006, pp. 2-12.   
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Power sharing that was promised in 1991 during the establishment of the 
transitional government is incorporated in the current Constitution. The 
Ethiopian government has also repeatedly claimed that it is progressively 
realizing what has been promised under the Constitution. However, de facto 
single party system has continued to be a serious challenge to the realization 
genuine federalism in Ethiopia.54 It was the failure to address the question of 
nationalities which resulted in the removal of the Derg regime.55 Yet, the current 
ruling party which came to power by war relies on its military power by setting 
aside the promises for equitable distribution of power at the federal level among 
nationalities and thus the tension among ethnic groups remains unsettled. 
The popular discontent in 2016 has signaled some structural and operational 
problems with the Ethiopian ethnic federal system. The Constitution, for 
example, lacks clarity on intergovernmental relations within the federation in 
general and between the Oromia region and the capital, Addis Ababa, in 
particular. Such lack of clarity coupled with over 25 years of ethnification has 
resulted in popular discontent which forced the government to cancel the Addis 
Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Master Plan.56 The issue of Welkait, 
which has been initiated by the leaders of the community peacefully, did not 
also receive the government’s willingness to handle it according to the 
constitutionally proclaimed procedures and this had fermented anti-government 
resentment in the Amhara region.57 This author does not suggest ethnic 
federalism. However, given the fact that the Constitution grants unconditional 
right to the nations, nationalities and peoples to decide their own fate (including 
secession) and because the government has stated this right as the pillar of the 
existing federal system, negating identity related issues would stand against the 
fundamental principles of the Ethiopian ethnic federal system. That in turn 
would erode trust on the government.                 
Needless to say, a federal system that merely gives territorial autonomy to a 
country’s ethnic, linguistic or religious groups could not be sufficient, in 
multicultural federations like India and Ethiopia, to ensure respect for rights of 
minorities. In both countries, there are minority groups scattered over different 
areas, and, in effect, they do not occupy a defined territory. In Ethiopia, for 
example, there are about 80 ethnic groups, but only 9 states and two city 
administrations. This would mean that there are many ethnic groups (minorities 
in the various regional states) that could be excluded. 
                                           
54 Ibid.  
55 The socialist Dergue regime was removed after a bloody war caused by the then policy 
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In a nutshell, unless the interests of ethnic, linguistic or religious groups are 
accommodated through federal shared institutions equitably, there will always 
be a high potential for conflicts. Mere enactment of laws that adhere to federal 
principles cannot create harmony and unity within diversity unless there is 
genuine share of political power which enables these groups to secure their 
interests under the federal setup. Failure to establish inclusive shared federal 
institutions thus poses a threat to a union in a federal system.  
3.2 Representativeness of the federal legislatures and minorities’ 
protection 
It is through laws made by the federal legislature that a federal system achieves 
its goals regarding areas of common interest. As long as the federal legislature 
lacks legitimacy, or if it is not a genuine representative of different groups 
within a federation, the federal system cannot effectively function in a stable 
manner. For a federal legislature to be a legitimate representative, it has to 
satisfy two things. First, as federalism is about unity in diversity, the federal 
legislature has to constitute both elements of unity and diversity. It should thus 
include both the lower and upper houses. Second, chambers represent diverse 
interests and lower houses represent the interests of all citizens in the federation. 
If one house is excluded, it means that one element of federalism is missing. 
The Ethiopian unicameral legislature fails to include one of these elements as 
the House of Federation (the upper house) does not participate in the lawmaking 
process. It is only the lower house (House of Peoples Representatives) which 
can make laws.58 This means that it fails to satisfy the yardstick for legitimacy 
of a federal legislature. Both the US59 and India60 have bicameral legislatures in 
which both the lower and upper houses participate in lawmaking. The second 
element for a federal legislature to be legitimate is that the upper house must 
genuinely represent diversity and the lower house must represent unity.   
In the US, the upper house (the Senate) has two members from each state 
(Art I section 3) and its members are elected directly by the people (Amendment 
XVII). Thus, the US upper house represents both small and larger states equally 
and this can avoid domination of large and populous states over small ones. Yet, 
such a system can ensure equality only between states but not among diverse 
groups. Minority groups within a regional state could be dominated by the 
majority group in that state although the state is represented equally with other 
states at the federal level. The emphasis on the well-established egalitarian 
principles including individual liberalism, equality and non-discrimination in the 
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59 Id., Art I section 1.  
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US has made preservation of diversity and minorities’ protection less important 
issues in the country.  
The upper house in India (the Council of States or the House of 
Representatives of States, Art 80), like the US senate, represents states and not 
diversities per se. In addition to its failure to represent diversity, the Indian 
upper house can also be dominated by the largest states as the seats are allocated 
based on proportional representation principle (i.e. seats are allocated based on 
population size of constituent units). 
The House of Federation (the upper house in Ethiopia) represents diversity 
although the allocation system enables the largest regional states to dominate 
smaller ones as each nationality, in addition to its one seat right, can have extra 
seats for each one million population.61 The House of Federation represents 
diversity as members are representatives of nations, nationalities and peoples of 
Ethiopia. But the House of Federation has no lawmaking role. There are two 
prominent problems with the Ethiopian upper house. First, it is dominated by 
few larger nationalities as they can have more seats for every one million extra 
population in addition to their rights for one seat. Secondly, it has no power to 
vote on laws. The basic reason behind the past conflicts and removal of 
government systems by war was the absence of a genuine share of power at the 
center.  This has continued because, as Shola Omotola states, “real power is 
exercised in centralized fashion” by the ruling party and its ethno-national 
satellites under … tight control …”.62  
The Constitution recognizes equality among the nationalities and their right 
to self-determination up to secession. The right to secessions is not incorporated 
in other modern federations. Thus, if one takes a look at the Constitution 
without considering what the reality on the ground is, he/she may say that the 
nationalities (which are ethnic groups in Ethiopia) are given unlimited rights and 
are more autonomous than other nationalities anywhere in the world. But the 
way the federation operates is far from what the Constitution has declared. As 
Merera, an opposition party leader, stated in his speech on a political debate, 
there is no genuine sharing of power and democracy in Ethiopia.63 He has 
mentioned and underlined this again during the 2015 Ethiopian general election 
debate aired by the Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation (EBC).64 Merera, in his 
                                           
61 Art 61 sub article 2 of the FDRE Constitution.  
62 J. Shola Omotola (2006), Review of Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian experience in 
comparative perspective, edited by David Turton, Oxford: James Currey, p.305. 
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speech, stated that “the EPRDF/ruling party governance system in Ethiopia falls 
under the category of pseudo democracy.”65 
The legitimacy deficit in the federal legislature, single party dominance and 
party discipline have resulted in a centralized political system while the 
Constitution has established a federal system. As I have explained before, the 
federal legislature of Ethiopia does not reflect diversity as the upper house 
which represents nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia has no power to 
vote on laws. This means that the system cannot adequately resolve the problem 
of diversity unless a bicameral legislature is established. The Ethiopian federal 
system should thus draw lessons from the US, India and other federal systems to 
set a legitimate legislature suitable to address problems in a federal system. 
When we see the role played by second chambers, in almost all federations 
except a few like Ethiopia, they have significant say in law making process.  
3.3 Electoral systems and their impact on minorities’ protection 
The type of electoral system followed by federal countries has an impact on 
representation of diverse interests.66 Members of the lower house in Ethiopia,67 
India68 and the US are elected based on a “single member constituency plurality 
electoral system.”69 Other federal systems including Switzerland employ 
proportional representation with a view to accommodate minority political 
parties to represent the interests of minority groups.70 
There are problems with both types of electoral systems. While the electoral 
system adopted in the US, India and Ethiopia may enable these federations to 
establish effective and stable legislative bodies, this happens at the expense of 
underrepresentation of minority parties71 and ultimately this has adverse impact 
on the representation of diversity within these federal systems. To avoid 
problems of underrepresentation produced by “plurality-majority voting 
systems”, the proportional representation system is introduced in most (21 out 
of 28) of the countries in Western Europe.72 But, it is difficult to establish a 
stable legislature and, most of the time, there will be coalitions of political 
parties to form the executive as there is a low chance for one party to form a 
                                           
65 Ibid.  
66 Supra note 8, p. 90.  
67 http://www.electionsethiopia.org/Electoral%20System%20print.html 
68 http://www.cfr.org/publication/19105/indias_electoral_politics.html 
69 Supra note 8. 
70 Ibid.  
71 Ibid.  
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majority. That in turn leads to frequent disagreements on how to govern a 
country.73 
It is obvious that the proportional electoral system is fair and more inclusive 
than the single member plurality electoral system. Especially, in federations like 
Ethiopia where the second house which represents diversity has no lawmaking 
power, it is necessary to introduce a more accommodative electoral system to 
enable different groups to have a say in the lower house. As explained in the 
previous sections, the upper houses of the US, India and Ethiopia lack one or 
more elements to be genuine representatives of diverse interests. The Ethiopian 
and Indian upper houses are more problematic because they fail to avoid control 
of the upper house by larger states.  
Election of members of the second chamber of India and Ethiopia is by the 
legislatures of regional states. This creates an additional problem in the 
functioning of the federal system as there will be an opportunity for a ruling 
party to control this house through a party discipline system. In such a case, 
members cannot serve as real representatives of either the interests of regional 
states or diverse groups of people in a region. To ensure that those neglected 
groups in the past are well represented in the federal lower house, the 
Constitution of India has obliged states to reserve seats for scheduled Tribes and 
Castes. This is a relevant step to represent a particular group in the lower house 
as candidates belonging to that particular Caste or Tribe are elected only to 
represent that group. But, the total number of reserved seats is lower than half of 
the number of members of the lower house and it is difficult to influence the 
majority in this house unless such scheme is supported by wisely designed upper 
house. Proportional electoral system or reservation of a significant number of 
seats for marginalized groups and a representative upper house with a 
lawmaking role are necessary for a federal system in general and particularly 
where it is multicultural.   
4. Potential Threats to Unity in a Federal System 
In every federation, there are potential factors which lead to conflict and, in 
serious cases, total collapse of a federation. A federation needs formal 
institutions and principles of intergovernmental relationship (IGR) to handle 
such problems amicably. The Ethiopian IGR system is mainly informal 
dominated by the ruling party.74As Burgess explains, “the coexistence of self-
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rule and shared rule means that conflict, competition and cooperation are 
institutionalized in a peculiar way that perpetuates problems of great 
complexity”.75 There will be more dangers to unity in a federal system if 
constitutional and political mechanisms are not employed to handle potential 
sources of conflict.  
As the units of a federal system form a federation to maintain a balance 
between unity and diversity, strengthening unity or diversity alone may result in 
the collapse of the federation. Too much emphasis on unity may gradually take 
away the powers of constituent units. That may force member states to leave the 
federation. Excessive emphasis on diversity is also equally dangerous to a union 
in a federation. It, in the long run, may make states stronger than the federal 
government and that may enable them to ignore the federal government and 
secede from the federation unilaterally.    
Most of the time, excessive asymmetry of power, absence of supremacy 
clause to settle conflicts between federal and state jurisdictions, arranging 
boundaries of a federation based on ethnicity (ethnic federalism), constitutional 
secession clause and failure to represent diversity in federal institutions are 
among the potential sources of conflict which endanger union in a federation. 
This section will focus on these potential dangers to unity in a federal system. 
4.1 Excessive asymmetry of power 
As explained in the previous section, there is asymmetry of power in every 
federation. Political asymmetry, in particular, is unavoidable as it is caused by 
differences in terms of population size, skilled manpower, resources and other 
factors. There is also constitutional asymmetry in some federations. Asymmetry 
of power becomes a source of conflict and instability when it is undesired or 
excessive. As Govinda Rao and Nirvikar Singh stated:   
Asymmetry in administrative, political and economic spheres in federal 
systems is unavoidable and in fact, may be necessary not only to ‘come 
together’ but also to ‘hold together’. However, while transparent asymmetric 
arrangements that can be justified on grounds of overall gains to the 
federation contribute to nation building, the discriminatory policies followed 
purely on short term political gains can be inimical to the long term interests 
and stability of federalism.76 
Asymmetry of power will be excessive in more centralized federations and the 
worst scenario will be in case there is/are state/s which is/are stronger than the 
centralized federal government.77 In a centralized federation, the central 
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government has more discretionary power than a non-centralized one and that 
may lead to asymmetrical treatment of constituent units. If such centralized 
federal system is controlled by only a few states or where there is/are state/s 
which is/are stronger than the central government, there will be much more 
room for discrimination against the remaining states and that worsens the 
asymmetry of power as the stronger states will tend to stand for their own 
interest. Based on the Indian scenario regarding this problem, Govinda Rao and 
Nirvikar observed that “the states ruled by regional parties with significant 
strength in the parliament (federal parliament) have become pivotal and have 
been able to secure substantially higher resources relative to other states.”78 That 
would result in excessive or undesired asymmetry of power.  
In India, there is a growing trend of asymmetry of power. While some 
constitutional and political asymmetries that have developed in India are 
appropriate for the smooth functioning of the federation, there is excessive 
asymmetry of power which is caused by “changing configuration of political 
power structure, vagaries of coalition and regional party politics”79 and that 
could be a danger to the union in the long run.80 
As explained earlier, political asymmetry of power is unavoidable. It can 
only be minimized by using constitutional asymmetry which may be helpful to 
address challenges from influential constituent units. But, in the long run it may 
have a divisive impact. As the experience in India indicates, granting special 
rights for one or more states in a federation can induce others to claim similar 
special rights, and such competition may lead to conflicts. 
Both the US and Ethiopian federations are constitutionally symmetric. The 
states in these federations have equal rights and powers. But, there is political 
asymmetry in both federations like all other federations. In the US, there are 
also non-state units which are treated asymmetrically. Such asymmetric 
treatment of non-state units is meant to address substantial differences. As G. 
Alan Tarr clarifies, “geographical position mattered in the case of island 
territories; differences in style of life and traditional forms of governance 
influenced the treatment of Indian tribes; and differences in ethnicity affected 
the status of Puerto Rico and other islands.”81 What has to be noted here is that, 
unlike in India and Canada82, asymmetrical treatments in the US are not 
designed for component units (states). Rather, they apply to non-state units 
including non-state islands, the District of Colombia (where the nation’s capital 
exists) and Indian tribes. Alan Tarr has explained this point:  
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Typically –particularly in multi-ethnic federations– it is the component units 
that seek distinctive (asymmetrical) arrangements as a means of recognizing 
and accommodating diversities. In the United States, in contrast, the 
asymmetrical arrangements were devised by and imposed by the federal 
government, and these steps were taken to serve national objectives, not the 
distinctive needs of the component units.83 
Alan Tarr added that such arrangements in the US helped to avoid control of the 
nation’s capital by a state84 and it provides “an orderly procedure whereby 
sparsely inhabited territories could be governed until population growth 
qualified them for statehood”.85 Therefore, asymmetric treatment of non-state 
units in US is for the healthy functioning of the federation and it does not lead to 
conflict between states.    
Even though there is constitutional symmetry of power in Ethiopia like in the 
US, the political party structure has resulted in undesired asymmetry of power. 
In reality, the ruling party controls the military and executive apparatus in 
Ethiopia.  In this regard Lovise Aalen stated that “The TPLF was the creator of 
the coalition (EPRDF) and the architect of the ethnic federal model” and he 
further noted that “The TPLF, through the EPRDF coalition, has not been able 
to demonstrate a genuine will to share power with other political forces in a 
democratic manner”.86 
4.2 Constitutionally proclaimed right to secede   
While the US and Indian federations have indestructible union,87 the FDRE 
Constitution has established a destructible union. The US federation is 
“indestructible union of indestructible states”88 and the Indian federation is 
“indestructible union of destructible states.”89 In Ethiopia, both the union and 
the states are destructible, i.e. in principle, nations, nationalities and peoples of 
Ethiopia can secede from the federation or form their own state, zone or district 
within the federation.90  
Article 39(1) of the Constitution of Ethiopia proclaims that “every Nation, 
Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-
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determination, including the right to secession”.91  “Right to self-determination 
short of secession”92 is recognized in every federation to give autonomy to 
regional units or to protect rights of minorities.93 But, what is unique in Ethiopia 
is that there is a constitutional right to self-determination including secession.   
International law is unclear as to whether right to self-determination includes 
the right to secede. The widely accepted approach is that the right to external 
self-determination (secession) is an exclusive right of nations “under colonial 
rule”94 and its application beyond this is only in case of failure to include a 
nation in a democratic political process or when massive human rights 
violations occur.95 As Abate Nikodimos states, “if a government is democratic 
and inclusive, then the right has less international legitimacy.”96 While the 
FDRE Constriction is inclusive, the government has undermined the 
constitutional principles and there is no genuine share of power as I explained 
elsewhere. Failure to ensure equitable share of power on one hand and the 
constitutionally proclaimed unconditional and unilateral right to secede on the 
other have inspired some opposition groups to form military fronts to fight the 
present government to effect secession. 
The secession clause under the FDRE Constitution, assuming that there is 
democratic environment to exercise it, is a time bomb for the union. Firstly, its 
incorporation under the Constitution may create a sense of leaving the 
federation and that may lead to bloody conflicts. Abate Nikodimos underlines 
that the “inclusion of the secession clause itself might encourage groups to try 
the option, and this might consequently create distrust and destabilizes the unity 
of the country”.97 Nor can we be optimistic about post-session scenarios. One 
can recall the bloody war between Eritrea and Ethiopia just some years after the 
secession of Eritrea.  
Secondly, when we see the right under the Constitution, it is unconditional 
and unilateral which would mean that, assuming that there is a democratic 
government, it is so easy for any nation, nationality or people to secede as long 
as the majority of the people concerned opt for it. The federal government or 
other states within the federation have no say at all regarding the secession 
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process and the nation which requests for secession does not have to provide the 
reason why it wants to secede.  
As clearly stated under Art 39(1) of the Constitution, the right of nations, 
nationalities and people to secede is unconditional.98  The federal government is 
obliged by the Constitution to provide referendum for secession within three 
years after it received the request for secession which is approved by the 
“Legislative Council of the Nation, Nationality or People concerned.”99 Then, it 
is up to the people of such Nation, Nationality or People concerned to decide on 
whether to secede or not through the referendum. Therefore, secession under the 
FDRE Constitution is both unconditional and unilateral. Nor can state of 
emergency be decreed to ‘suspend or limit’ the right to secession because this 
becomes unconstitutional under Article 93(4)(c) of the FDRE Constitution.   
No other federation in the world has a secession clause. This is because it can 
lead to unlimited fragmentation which goes against international law and global 
order. Unity, common defense, greater market and economic development and 
social cooperation are given emphasis in every federation. Thus, the secession 
clause under the FDRE constitution is among the unique features of the 
Ethiopian federation.  
Of course, there are instances of secession questions even although other 
federations have no secession clause in their constitutions. The question of 
secession raised by Quebec can be cited as an example. But, what is 
constitutionally incorporated in Ethiopia and what is decided by the Supreme 
Court of Canada regarding secession are substantially different. While the 
Ethiopia’s Constitution grants unconditional and unilateral right to secede, the 
Supreme Court of Canada rejected such unilateral and unconditional right to 
secede. It stated that, “while unilateral secession would be unconstitutional, a 
clear expression by the people of Quebec of their will to secede from Canada 
would impose a reciprocal obligation on all parties to Confederation to negotiate 
constitutional changes to respond to that desire”.100 At this juncture, it should be 
noted that “self-determination short of secession”101, if implemented in a 
democratic way, can bring the desired autonomy.  
4.3 Arranging federal boundaries primarily based on ethnicity (Ethnic 
federalism) 
A federation may adopt a form of distributive or ethnic federalism in organizing 
its constituent units. While the purpose of distributive federalism is to divide 
power between the federal and regional states to ensure liberty and democracy 
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and thus is organized based on administrative convenience, ethnic federalism is 
moulded based on identity and its aim is to give power (autonomy) for each 
ethnic group.  India has reorganized the states along ethnic and religious lines in 
1966.102 Given the constitutional powers of the union in India, the federal 
arrangement which is organized based on linguistic and religious identities is 
not a threat to the union though the tension it creates between ethnic groups may 
lead to continuous conflicts among the tribes, castes, provinces or territories. 
The union has the right to reorganize the states, it can merge two or more states 
into one, it can establish new states from one or more existing states and it can 
direct states to execute the laws in a manner it deems necessary.  
What is more, the centralized court system, the federal legislature’s power to 
enact laws in the national interest on any area which belongs to states and the 
union’s power to change the federation into a unitary form of government in 
case of emergency are all meant to maintain unity.   
In view of historical experiences of disruptive and disintegrative sectarian 
forces and the political context of partition prevailing at the time of 
independence, the founding fathers of the Indian Constitution wanted to 
strengthen the Union against possible disintegrative pressures.103 
Ambedkar, one of the drafters of the Indian Constitution, had stated during the 
discussion on the draft constitution: 
Though India was to be a federation, the federation was not the result of an 
agreement by the states to join in a federation. Not being a result of an 
agreement, no state has the right to secede from it. Though the country and 
the people may be divided into different states for convenience of 
administration, the country is one integral whole, its people a single people 
living under a single imperium derived from a single source. ... The Drafting 
Committee thought it was better to make [this] clear at the outset rather than 
leave it to speculation...104 
The form of ethnic federalism introduced in Ethiopia is different from what is 
adopted in India. As Minasse explains, “although the Indian Constitution of 
1950 has been thought to have served as a model emulated by the drafters of the 
Ethiopian Constitution, the similarity between the two constitutions is 
superficial”.105 According to Minasse, there are conditions in India which can 
ensure the integrity of the federation and those conditions are lacking in 
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Ethiopia.106 The FDRE Constitution has used language and ethnicity in 
organizing the states and every group which is identified as a “nation, 
nationality or people”107 has the right to self-determination including secession. 
Though the undemocratic nature of the ruling government has left the 
constitutional provisions untested, full implementation of the ethnic 
arrangement introduced in the Constitution will be so hazardous for stability of 
the federation.  
According to Minasse, the ethnic federal arrangement established by the 
Constitution has introduced perplexing and damaging structures which inspire 
tribal groups to fight each other and that may lead to disintegration.108  He 
further noted: 
“the dangerous nature of the Ethiopian federation is found mainly in the near 
total transfer of sovereignty from the center to tribal regions, in the 
disproportionate powers allocated to the tribal sub-units collectively and 
individually and in the creation of a government of unlimited powers.”109 
Careful reading of Arts 8 and 39(5) of the FDRE Constitution reveals that there 
is no sovereignty vested in the people of Ethiopia as a whole. Art 8 declares that 
sovereignty is vested in the “nations, nationalities and people of Ethiopia”.110 
And when we see the definition of “nations, nationalities and people of 
Ethiopia” under Art 39(1), it does not refer to the people of Ethiopia as a whole; 
rather it refers to ethnic groups.111 
Those individuals who have mixed identity or are advocates of Ethiopianism 
have to ascribe themselves to one of the ethnic groups in Ethiopia. They can be 
participants in the political process only if they attribute themselves to one of 
the ethnic groups. This has eroded the common destiny Ethiopians have for 
“millennia”.112 It undermines the common historical, religious and social ties of 
all nationalities in Ethiopia including the victory of all nations, nationalities and 
people against foreign invasions at Adwa and other battlefields. The Northward 
movement and political domination of the Oromo over areas including Wello 
and Gondar in the 16 century and the Southward movement of the Amhara in 
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the 19 century113 are also among the significant historical events which link the 
Ethiopian people by blood and culture. It is to be noted that Imam Ibrahim 
(usually referred to as Ahmed Gragn) who had expanded his control to most 
parts of Ethiopia in the 16th Century had established his capital in Dembia and 
not Harar. Thus, Ethiopian people have shared memories, assimilation, various 
moves of expansion, and blended values contrary to the misperceptions that are 
in the course of being nurtured as a result of the present ethnic federal system 
which is steadily eroding the elements of Ethiopianess in the identity of citizens 
and, in effect, creating the climate of fear, suspicion and hostility among ethnic 
groups.  
Economically, it will be impossible to establish states for all ethnic groups.114 
Thus, some groups cannot be influential enough to exercise their right to self-
determination. Therefore, the ethnic federal arrangement may benefit only 
dominant ethnic groups. Even people who belong to such groups may be 
minorities in other regions and thus may not have the same autonomy their 
ethnic group enjoys on the territory it dominates.           
As many opposition politicians argue, federalism is indispensable for 
Ethiopia but not ethnic federalism.115 The International Crisis Group has also 
warned against the danger the Ethiopian ethnic federal system. Its 2009 report 
states:   
While the concept has failed to accommodate grievances, it has powerfully 
promoted ethnic self-awareness among all groups. The international 
community has ignored or downplayed all these problems. Some donors 
appear to consider food security more important than democracy in Ethiopia, 
but they neglect the increased ethnic awareness and tensions created by the 
regionalization policy and their potentially explosive consequences.116 
Hence, the ethnic federal system in Ethiopia is a threat to integrity and nation 
building. Ethiopia’s pre-1991 provinces were not organized based on language. 
The provinces facilitated interactions between Ethiopian people from different 
ethnic groups. Thus, solely using language as a means of political organization 
ignores other important factors. As Assefa Fiseha states, “restoration of 
Ethiopia’s historic provinces and organizing them on a federal basis”117can 
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bring administrative convenience and it will be more accommodative as 
“provincialism is one element of diversity that defines Ethiopian society.”118 
This can also minimize the asymmetry of power and tension among the ethnic 
groups.       
4.4 Lack of genuine representation of diversity 
As explained earlier, accommodation of diversity is one of the purposes of 
federalism in multicultural federal systems like India and Ethiopia. 
Accommodation or representation of diversity does not, however, necessarily 
need ethnic federalism. Accommodation of diversity and the establishment of a 
democratic environment that enhances the participation of diverse groups are 
crucial to avoid marginalization of some groups within a multi-cultural 
federation. If these conditions are lacking in practice, those groups left behind or 
groups which do not get appropriate share of power will opt to leave a union. 
Thus, failure to equitably represent diversity through shared federal institutions 
will create real threats to the integrity of a federation.  
The core principle in the US federal system is ‘liberal democracy.’119 
‘Individual liberty’120 is thus the bedrock of the federation. Ethnic identity is not 
used as a basis in determining boundaries of the states and in sharing powers 
within the federation. This would mean that there will not be a question by a 
particular ethnic group to share power as one identified group within the 
federation. The fact that US federalism is based on liberal democracy does not, 
however, mean that diverse groups have no rights at all. Because of the wide 
exclusions of and discriminations against the minorities by the majorities in 
different states, the states have developed their own minority rights protection 
systems. As Alan Tarr explains, “state courts have responded with rulings 
granting protections for rights beyond those afforded by the federal 
constitution”.121 He states that, the state courts and constitutions play important 
roles in protecting minority rights.122 
Unlike the US, the Ethiopian and Indian federal constitutions are committed 
to accommodation of diverse groups. The problem in both federations (Ethiopia 
and India) relates to the absence of accommodation in practice. The various 
issues discussed above including poor democratic culture in Ethiopia and 
disproportionate power given for the union of India are among the factors that 
have caused gaps in the accommodative environment. This has resulted in many 
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communal conflicts in India123 and has created ethnic tensions in Ethiopia 
including ethnic based military groups that are fighting against the Ethiopian 
government. 
5. Constitutional Review, Unity and Minorities’ Protection 
Federal or quasi federal forms of government are more complex than unitary 
forms of government. The competition for power and resources among the 
constitutional actors within federations exposes them to disputes. This would 
mean that federal governments need to have strong and well organized 
constitutional umpire to handle horizontal and vertical disputes among 
constitutional actors. As federal constitutions divide power between the two 
levels of government and because such division of power has to be guaranteed 
for a system to remain federal, neither level of government should have 
unilateral power to interpret a constitution.  
5.1  Constitutional review: Who can request for it? 
While most countries have a system of constitutional review to evaluate the laws 
and decisions made by a legislative or executive body for their constitutionality, 
there is divergence in terms of the type of adjudicating body they adopt, the type 
of claim which can be made before this body, the sort of organizations or 
persons who can bring constitutional complaints and the composition of the 
adjudicating body.124 Such differences have an impact on the protection of 
minorities and maintenance of a union in a federal system. This would mean that 
federal systems need to have umpiring institutions which can keep the spirit of 
federalism in addition to the protection of individual rights and supervision of 
horizontal separation of powers which are also essential in the constitutional 
review schemes of unitary governments.  
The issue as to who can request for constitutional review depends on the 
particular spirit or purpose that is pursued in a federal system. For example, as 
the US federal system is based on the principle of liberal democracy, the vertical 
and horizontal divisions of power are meant to achieve individual liberty and 
democracy.125 Group identity is not relevant under the US Constitution. This 
means, a group of people or a person belonging to this group has no standing to 
request for constitutional review before the US Supreme Court or other federal 
courts in order to claim a special right based on identity. As indicated earlier, 
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there are state constitutions and courts which have developed minorities’ 
protection systems and thus there may be such claims in these states. 
In India and Ethiopia, ethnic, religious and linguistic groups are the central 
elements in the respective federations. Hence, an ethnic, linguistic or religious 
group or an individual belonging to this group may request for constitutional 
review to secure a right based on such identity. Thus the issue who has standing 
in a given federation depends on the particular purpose that federation wishes to 
achieve. These days, there is an increasing trend of allowing individual 
complaints for constitutional review with a view to protecting fundamental 
individual rights.126 
 A federation which can be an example for providing wider access for 
constitutional review is Germany. “State bodies of all levels, ordinary courts, the 
Lander, constitutional courts of the Lander and any individual (alleging 
violation of his/her fundamental rights) can bring constitutional complaint 
before the Constitutional Court and the Constitutional Court has the power of 
both abstract and concrete review.127 In the US, though there is no abstract 
review, anyone who satisfies general ‘standing’ requirements for litigation can 
raise a constitutional issue in court. 
 In India, Articles 12-31 in Part III of the Constitution provide fundamental 
individual rights and minority rights.128 Art 32 provides that the Supreme Court 
has the power of constitutional review to enforce these rights.129 Therefore, 
individuals, minority groups or an individual belonging to a minority group may 
bring constitutional compliant to the Supreme Court of India. But, the Supreme 
Court itself has very limited power of constitutional review. For example, the 
Supreme Court’s decision on constitutionality can be reversed by the parliament 
through constitutional amendment in case the parliament is not satisfied with the 
Court’s decision.130 In 1967, the Supreme Court confronted the influence 
exerted by the parliament by passing a landmark decision in the Golaknath case 
stating that fundamental rights cannot be amended. In Ethiopia, any interested 
party has the right to institute a constitutional complaint by virtue of Article 37 
of the Constitution.131 
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5.2 The adjudicating body that best serves protection of minorities and 
unity 
Historical, political, cultural and social differences among federations have led 
to the establishment of different institutions entrusted with the power of 
constitutional review. Supreme courts in federal systems including the US, 
Canada, Australia and India have the final say on constitutional matters.132 We 
also find specialized courts that can exercise this power such as the German 
Constitutional Court. This is currently pursued in many federal and unitary 
states including Belgium, Comoros, Spain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, South 
Africa and Hungary.133 Ethiopia has followed a unique model. The power of 
constitutional review in Ethiopia is vested in a non-judicial political 
organization, the House of Federation.134 
Four major arguments are forwarded in support of the House of Federation’s 
power to adjudicate constitutional disputes. The first argument is that 
sovereignty under the Ethiopian constitution is vested in the nations, 
nationalities and peoples under Art 8 and as the Constitution, and since, the 
House of Federation represents these groups it is the proper organ to interpret 
the Constitution. But, this is not valid because it assumes that the federation is a 
coming together federation, i.e., one formed based on the free consent of 
nations, nationalities and peoples, which would mean that the nations, 
nationalities or peoples had had the capacity not to join the federation at the 
time. The constitution making process was under the control of the ruling party 
dominated by Tigray Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF) and thus the 
Constitution cannot be seen as a genuine reflection of the will of nations, 
nationalities and peoples. To use the words of Lovise Aalen, “the process of 
drafting and ratifying the Constitution was totally dominated by the ruling party, 
and hence, the federal project lost legitimacy”.
135
 One cannot, therefore, assume 
the Ethiopian federation as a coming together federation. Thus, the first reason 
which justifies constitutional review by the House of Federation is not tenable.  
The second justification for vesting this power in the House of Federation is 
absence of confidence in ordinary courts because of the history of the Ethiopian 
courts. This argument is also weak as reform can make courts much better and 
impartial than a single party dominated political institution. 
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The third argument is that vesting this power in the judiciary is inappropriate 
as judges will give priority to legal values and disregard political elements in 
constitutional disputes.
136
 This argument may be persuasive but it does not lead 
to the inference that a political institution is the best alternative to adjudicate 
constitutional cases. Given the diversity in Ethiopia, ordinary courts may not be 
the right institutions to adjudicate all types of constitutional matters. Judges in 
the ordinary courts may give preference to mere literal readings of the law and 
fail to consider cultural, ethnic, religious, linguistic and other identities in 
exercising their power of constitutional review. But this does not justify the 
power of constitutional review by a non-judicial political institution (i.e. House 
of Federation) especially, when such political institution is controlled by a 
dominant party thereby lacking independence. It is indeed possible to establish a 
specialized court with specialized judges who can consider both legal and other 
legal factors. Thus, the German Constitutional Court can be adopted in Ethiopia 
with some modification. 
It is, however, to be noted that a specialized court will be overburdened with 
cases and can be ineffective if all cases, including the ones that involve 
fundamental individual rights are directly brought to it. Ordinary courts can be 
proper judicial institutions to determine constitutional cases regarding such 
cases because they involve more legal than non-legal issues. Fundamental 
individual rights cases are frequent as they are everyday questions of citizens. 
Thus, ordinary courts need to have involvement in determining constitutional 
disputes concerning fundamental individual rights. But, there are other 
constitutional disputes which require the consideration of non-legal factors 
thereby necessitating specialized courts and judges to address such 
constitutional cases. Therefore, both ordinary courts and a specialized 
constitutional court need to have the power to determine constitutional disputes.  
The fourth reason mentioned as a justification for constitutional review by 
the House of Federation is the argument that issues regarding horizontal 
separation of powers often involve both legal and political elements and thus 
courts may lack competence to adjudicate such cases.
137
 The US judiciary is 
mentioned as one example facing a problem in adjudicating such cases.
138
 It 
should, however, be noted that although the US Supreme Court had refused to 
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 against the political departments in Marbury v. Madison 
indicating that the case involves a political issue, the Court underlined that it has 
power to declare a law or executive action void.
140
 The Marbury v. Madison 
case thus establishes the power of the judiciary to invalidate the laws and 
executive actions for their unconstitutionality.  
While the power to invalidate laws and executive actions for their 
unconstitutionality is upheld consistently, the approach which limits the power 
of courts when a constitutional case involves a political issue is not. The well-
established precedent which is applicable now reveals that what matters is not 
whether a case involves a political issue or not, but whether the case can be 
decided by applying the constitution or laws in the country. The Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1946 and the judicial precedent have removed the constraint 
which existed earlier. 
Conclusion  
This article has explored the territorial or nation-state federal system of the US, 
the formally centralized quasi-federal system of India and the Ethiopian ethnic 
federal system from the perspectives of unity and protection of minority groups. 
It has highlighted that neither the US territorial federal system nor the purely 
ethnic federal arrangement followed by Ethiopia can be a solution for multi-
cultural states like India and Ethiopia. A purely ethnic federal arrangement 
which ignores historical, economic and social factors in organizing political 
entities magnifies differences and leads to instability.       
While the forces of unity should not impose undesired restrictions on 
diversity, the other extreme of establishing a purely ethnic federal system and 
giving excessive emphasis for ethnic diversity (as in the Ethiopian federal 
system) is also problematic as this would lead to conflicts.  In a nutshell, neither 
individual liberalism nor communalism is a solution for most countries if the 
rights of all sections of the society are to be addressed. Once minority groups 
are identified, the rights given to them should accord them protection against 
despotism by the dominant group. However, minority rights should not be 
misconstrued to the extreme in such a manner that a minority group can 
destabilize a political system.141 
Based on various literature and analysis, this article has also indicated the 
problems associated with the electoral systems and the manner of selection of 
members of the upper houses of the US, Ethiopia and India. Shared federal 
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institutions are indispensable to work together on areas of common interest and 
that maintains a union in a federation. For shared federal institutions to be 
legitimate and effective, they have to accommodate diverse groups. One of the 
schemes that can accommodate regional or diverse interests through shared 
federal institutions is the establishment of a representative upper house. Each 
state in the US has two representatives in the Senate (upper house), and such 
equal representation of both small and larger states can be a safeguard against 
domination by the large ones. But, equal representation of states does not mean 
equal protection of diverse groups within each state as majority groups in each 
state can dominate minorities. This necessitates protection systems for regional 
minorities.  
While both the US and Indian federal legislatures are bicameral composed of 
both lower and upper houses, the Ethiopian legal regime does not enable the 
upper house which represents diversity, i.e., House of Federation, to have any 
involvement in the law making process. Thus, the constitutional protection of 
diverse groups in Ethiopia can easily be paralyzed through the lawmaking role 
of the lower house which is dominated by a few ethnic groups. To be legitimate, 
a federal legislature has to incorporate both unity (through the lower house) and 
diversity through the upper house. Thus, the Ethiopian legislature needs reform.  
India’s practice of setting a limit on the maximum number of seats for states or 
ethnic groups in the second chambers can be a feasible solution in Ethiopia to 
enable the minorities to collectively counterbalance the majorities in these 
federations.  
This article has also identified some potential threats to unity in federal 
systems. Excessive asymmetry of power, failure to accommodate diversity, 
constitutionally proclaimed right to secession, ethnic federalism and absence of 
federal supremacy clause are among the major potential threats to a union in a 
federation. While asymmetrical treatment of non-state units in the US has 
ensured healthy functioning of the federation, asymmetrical treatment among 
the states in India has led to some conflicts. In Ethiopia too, an excessive 
asymmetry of power caused by the de facto single party system has posed 
serious challenges to the integrity of the country.  
Finally, this article has briefly explored the constitutional umpiring 
institutions in the three jurisdictions. The discussion has shown that neither 
reliance solely on ordinary courts nor political institutions (such as the House of 
Federation) are feasible to determine constitutional disputes especially when a 
federal system is multicultural. Thus, constitutional disputes that involve 
fundamental individual rights can be adjudicated by ordinary courts and the 
establishment of a specialized court for the remaining disputes would be feasible 
to effectively address constitutional disputes.                                                      ■ 
 
